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

**ELECTRONICALLY FILED**  
Superior Court of California,  
County of San Diego  
**01/10/2017** at 04:38:00 PM  
Clerk of the Superior Court  
By Lee McAlister, Deputy Clerk

**SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA**  
**COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO—CENTRAL DIVISION**

CITIZENS OVERSIGHT INC., a Delaware non-profit corporation; RAYMOND LUTZ, an individual,	)	CASE NO: 37-2016-00020273-CL-MC-CTL
	)	<b>JUDGMENT AFTER COURT TRIAL</b>
Plaintiffs,	)	<b>IMAGED FILE</b>
vs.	)	
	)	<b>Hon. Joel R. Wohlfeil, Judge</b>
MICHAEL VU, San Diego Registrar of Voters; HELEN N. ROBBINS-MEYER, San Diego County Chief Administrative Officer; COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, a public entity; DOES 1-10,	)	Dept. 73
	)	Complaint filed: June 16, 2016
	)	Trial Date: October 3, 2016
Defendants.	)	
_____	)	

This action came on regularly for trial on October 4-6 and 11, 2016, in Department 73 of the above-entitled court, the Honorable Joel R. Wohlfeil, Judge presiding. Plaintiffs CITIZENS OVERSIGHT, INC. and RAYMOND LUTZ were represented by Alan L. Geraci, Esq. of CARE Law Group PC; Defendants MICHAEL VU, HELEN N. ROBBINS-MEYER and COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO were represented by the Office of County Counsel for the County of San Diego by Timothy M. Barry, Chief Deputy and Stephanie Karnavas, Senior Deputy.

During trial, the court heard and considered testimony from witnesses, admitted and considered documentary evidence, took judicial notice of other documents and material and heard and considered the opening and closing arguments of counsel. The parties filed pretrial





1 and post-trial briefs concerning the legal issues before the court. The Court prepared and  
 2 filed a Statement of Intended Decision ("SOID") on October 26, 2016, and after considering  
 3 the written objections to the SOID filed by both parties and the oral argument by counsel for  
 4 both parties, filed a Statement of Decision on December 19, 2016, pursuant to California  
 5 Code of Civil Procedure Section 632, a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated  
 6 herein by this reference as if set forth in full herein as Exhibit "A".

7 NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ADJUDICATED, ORDERED AND DECREED, that  
 8 judgment for declaratory relief, as enunciated in the court's Statement of Decision, be  
 9 entered as follows:

10 In favor of Plaintiffs CITIZENS OVERSIGHT, INC. and RAYMOND LUTZ and  
 11 against MICHAEL VU and COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO on Plaintiffs' claim that Elections  
 12 Code Section 15360 requires that the Registrar of Voters to include all Vote-by-Mail ballots  
 13 in the random selection process for purposes of completing the one percent manual tally; in  
 14 favor of Defendants MICHEL VU and COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO and against CITIZENS  
 15 OVERSIGHT, INC. and RAYMOND LUTZ on Plaintiffs' claim that Elections Code Section  
 16 15360 requires the Registrar of Voters to include provisional ballots in the random selection  
 17 process for purposes of completing the one percent manual tally; and, in favor of Defendant  
 18 HELEN ROBBINS-MEYER and against Plaintiffs on all causes of action raised by Plaintiffs'  
 19 Second Amended Complaint.

20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the clerk of the court issue a writ of mandamus  
 21 directing the Registrar of Voters Michael Vu to comply with Elections Code Section 15360  
 22 by including all Vote-by-Mail ballots in the random selection process for purposes of  
 23 completing the one percent manual tally in all future elections to which Section 15360  
 24 applies.

25 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that costs be awarded to the prevailing party on this  
 26 judgment in accordance with law pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1032 which  
 27 may be inserted herein by interlineation, after all required process therefor are further  
 28 adjudicated, to wit: \$ \_\_\_\_\_ Costs awarded to Per Memo of Costs. .



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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court shall retain jurisdiction to amend or enforce this Judgment as appropriate and according to law.

DATED: 01/10/2017

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
JOEL R. WOHLFEIL, Judge







EXHIBIT "A"



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**F I L E D**  
Clerk of the Superior Court

**DEC 19 2016**

By: J. CERDA

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

CITIZENS OVERSIGHT, INC., a Delaware non-profit corporation; RAYMOND LUTZ, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MICHAEL VU, San Diego Registrar of Voters; HELEN N. ROBBINS-MEYER, San Diego County Chief Administrative Officer; SAN DIEGO COUNTY, a public entity; DOES 1-10,


Defendants.

Case No. 37-2016-00020273-CL-MC-CTL

**STATEMENT OF DECISION**

Judge: Hon. Joel R. Wohlfeil  
Dept.: 73

This case came on regularly for trial on October 4 – 6 and 11, 2016 before the Honorable Joel R. Wohlfeil, Judge presiding. Plaintiffs CITIZENS OVERSIGHT INC. (“COI”) and RAYMOND LUTZ (“Plaintiff” or “Lutz”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) were represented by Alan L. Geraci of CARE Law Group PC; Defendants MICHAEL VU (“Defendant” or “Vu”), HELEN N. ROBBINS-MEYER (“ROBBINS-MEYER”) and COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO (“County”) (collectively “Defendants”) were represented by TIMOTHY M. BARRY and STEPHANIE KARNAVAS of the County Counsel for the County of San Diego The Court, after hearing testimony of witnesses (Vu, Lutz, Erin Mayer, Deborah Seiler, Charlie Wallis, Jill LaVine, Dean Logan, Julie Rodewald (through her deposition taken on September 23, 2016 – Exh’s “196, 197”) and Phillip Stark), receiving exhibits into evidence including the materials that the Court took



1 judicial notice of (Exhibits “1, 4, 9 – 14, 19, 49 – 53, 56, 58, 59, 62, 68, 69, 100 – 107, 109, 110, 138  
 2 – 140, 146, 147, 149, 150, 152, 154, 155, 158, 171, 175 – 180, 195, 199”), reading pre-trial briefs  
 3 (ROA # 92, 93), hearing arguments of counsel, reading post-trial closing briefs (ROA # 116, 118, ),  
 4 ruling on Plaintiffs and Defendants’ objections to the Court’s Statement of Intended Decision  
 5 (“SOID”) (ROA # 132, 137, 139), and good cause appearing therefore, hereby issues this Statement  
 6 of Decision (“SOD”).  
 7

8 **Introduction**

9  
 10 No other country in the world works as hard as the United States to preserve its election  
 11 integrity, a bedrock of its democratic principles.



12 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have not done enough; that Defendants have, in effect, cut  
 13 corners; that Defendants have not conducted the post-election 1% manual tally of "all" votes cast,  
 14 one risk of which is that Defendants have compromised the security of the County's voting system;  
 15 to wit, “a nefarious insider or a "hacker" could alter the results and the alterations would be  
 16 invisible to this audit procedure thereby making the audit procedure useless.” ROA # 92, page 3.

17 Defendants respond that the 1% manual tally statute is ambiguous and susceptible to more  
 18 than one interpretation; that Defendants have complied with the most reasonable of the competing  
 19 interpretations; and that to direct Defendants to do more would place an undue burden on  
 20 Defendants’ resources, one risk of which is that Defendants would be unable to “complete the  
 21 official canvass and certify election results to the Secretary of State’s office no later than 30 days  
 22 after an election.” Elections Code Section 15372.2. ROA # 93, page 1.

23 Simply stated, Plaintiffs argue breadth and Defendants respond with burden, the  
 24 reconciliation of which is, from the Court's perspective, not easy.  
 25

26 **Operative Pleadings**

27  
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1 In their verified Second Amended Complaint (“SAC” - ROA # 79), Plaintiffs allege causes  
2 of action for declaratory relief and mandamus under CCP 1085, the focus of which is California  
3 Election Code Section 15360.

4 In their verified Answer (ROA # 81) to the SAC, Defendants, at par. 11, “generally and  
5 specifically deny that the Registrar does not fully comply with the requirements of Section 15360”  
6 and assert as an affirmative defense that the SAC “fails to set forth facts sufficient to constitute a  
7 cause of action or right of relief against defendants, or any of them.”

8

9 **The Court’s July 25, 2016 Minute Order (ROA # 70)**


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11 The Court’s previous order states, in pertinent part:

12 “The Application of Plaintiffs Citizens Oversight Inc. and Raymond Lutz (“Plaintiffs”) for  
13 a Preliminary Injunction to direct Defendants MICHAEL VU, San Diego Registrar of Voters,  
14 HELEN N. ROBBINS-MEYER, San Diego County Chief Administrative Officer, and COUNTY  
15 OF SAN DIEGO (“Defendants”) to comply with California Election Code Section 15360, in  
16 certifying the Primary Election results of June 7, 2016, is DENIED AS MOOT, without prejudice,  
17 as reflected below.

18 First, the Court takes judicial notice of the July 15, 2016 press release from the California  
19 Secretary of State certifying California's June statewide primary results. Evid. Code 452(c).  
20 (<http://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/news-releases-and-advisories/2016-news-releases-and->  
21 [advisories /secretary-state-padilla-certifies-election-results/](http://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/news-releases-and-advisories/secretary-state-padilla-certifies-election-results/)). The Court infers that the state  
22 certification also entails the certification of the San Diego County primary results. As a result, the  
23 Application for preliminary injunction is MOOT as to Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief for  
24 the certification of the June 7, 2016 election. "In dismissing the appeal as moot...reversal of the  
25 judgment could not afford the plaintiffs relief because the issuance of an injunction restraining the  
26 defendant from doing that which he has already done, would be an idle and frivolous act, since  
27 such decision would have no binding authority and would not affect the legal rights of the parties."  
28 *Finnie v. Town of Tiburon* (1988) 199 Cal. App. 3d 581, 586. "... [A]lthough a case may originally





1 present an existing controversy, if before decision it has, through act of the parties or other cause,  
2 occurring after the commencement of the action, lost that essential character it becomes a moot  
3 case or question which will not be considered by the court." *Wilson v. Los Angeles County Civil*  
4 *Service Commission* (1952) 112 Cal. App. 2d 450, 453.

5 However, the Court is cognizant of the importance and exigent circumstances in this  
6 action, thereby necessitating an expedited ruling in this matter. Although moot to the Primary  
7 Election results of June 7, 2016, when an issue of broad public interest is posed, the Court may  
8 exercise its inherent discretion to resolve the issue. *Johnson v. Hamilton* (1975) 15 Cal. 3d 461,  
9 465.



10 Liberally construing the first cause of action for declaratory relief in Plaintiff's First  
11 Amended Complaint (FAC"), Plaintiff appears to seek a declaration regarding all future elections,  
12 which may recur as imminently as the upcoming November election. Therefore, the first cause of  
13 action is not moot.

14 The "1 percent manual tally is a procedure used in California to test whether there are any  
15 discrepancies between the electronic record generated by a voting machine and what is essentially  
16 a manual audit of that electronic record." *Nguyen v. Nguyen* (2008) 158 Cal. App. 4th 1636, 1643.  
17 In accordance with California law, the official canvas must include a manual tally as a means of  
18 verifying the accuracy of the system count. Elec. Code 15360. "This procedure is conducted  
19 during the official canvass to verify the accuracy of the automated count." Elec. Code 336.5.

20 Section 15360 provides two alternative methods to conduct this manual tally, using section  
21 15360(a) (1) or 15360(a) (2). Initially, Defendants opted to conduct the 1 percent manual tally  
22 under section 15360(a) (2). A public notice was subsequently posted on the San Diego County  
23 Registrar's website. Thereafter, Defendants' chose to conduct the 1 percent manual tally utilizing  
24 section 15360(a) (1). Declaration of Vu, pg. 6, 1-2.

25 California Elections Code 15360(a) (1), reads in relevant part: (a) During the official  
26 canvass ... the official conducting the election shall conduct a public manual tally of the ballots  
27 tabulated by those devices, including vote by mail ballots, using either of the following methods:  
28 (1) (A) A public manual tally of the ballots, including vote by mail ballots, cast in 1 percent of the





1 precincts chosen at random by the elections official. If 1 percent of the precincts is less than 1  
2 whole precinct, the tally shall be conducted in 1 precinct chosen at random by the elections  
3 official.

4 Plaintiffs provide evidence that Defendants are not complying with the elections code by  
5 failing to include all ballots cast in 1 percent of the precincts chosen at random. Specifically,  
6 Plaintiffs demonstrate Defendants are in violation of the statute by 1) not including any provisional  
7 ballots in the manual tally, and 2) by not including all vote by mail ballots.



8 The legislative history of California Elections Code 15360, amended in 2006, provides  
9 insight: SB 1235 stems from anecdotal reports that some counties routinely exclude absent voter  
10 and provisional ballots from the 1% manual tally process and may not be choosing the relevant  
11 precincts in a truly "random manner." California Bill Analysis, S.B. 1235 Sen., 4/19/2006.

12 The comments addressing auditing for accuracy provides: "Requiring all of the ballots –  
13 not just those cast at the polling place on Election Day – in a given precinct to be a part of the 1  
14 percent audit should increase the thoroughness and the reliability of the audit. Absent a complete  
15 count of all of the ballots in a precinct that's subject to the 1% audit, it's difficult to see how  
16 elections officials can argue they've complied with the audit requirements under the law."  
17 California Bill Analysis, S.B. 1235 Sen., 4/19/2006.

18 Therefore, in reviewing the legislative intent and explicit text of section 15360, there is a  
19 reasonable probability Plaintiffs will prevail. Section 15360 requires election officials to include  
20 Vote-by-Mail ballots cast and provisional ballots when conducting the one percent manual tally.  
21 Defendants did not do this.

22 Defendants demonstrate that complying with section 15360 will require additional "man  
23 hours" and additional costs in excess of \$100,000. Vu Dec. (ROA # 35), par's 21, 30, 36.  
24 Defendants also argue completing the manual tally process as soon as possible is a "prudent  
25 business practice." Opposition, p. 12, par's 15-16. County elections officials have approximately  
26 one month to complete their extensive tallying, auditing, and certification work so they can timely  
27 send a report to the California Secretary of State.

28



1 Plaintiffs' argue they 1) will be deprived of the verification required by law and 2) the  
 2 integrity of the election results will be compromised if Defendants are not in compliance with  
 3 section 15360. Section 15360 was enacted to serve as a check on the election process by means of  
 4 a manual audit. Notwithstanding the fact that San Diego County Registrar does not include  
 5 provisional ballots in their manual tally procedure, a practice consistent with other counties (ROA  
 6 #'s 36 – 42), it does not follow that Defendants are therefore in compliance with section 15360.  
 7 The San Diego County Registrar of Voters has a legal obligation to comply with section 15360. It  
 8 is imperative that auditing requirements are followed completely in order to ensure the continued  
 9 public confidence of election results. The San Diego County Registrar of Voters is obligated to  
 10 allocate its resources appropriately in order to comply with the law. If Defendants are unable to do  
 11 so, they must seek redress with the legislative or executive branches of government, not the  
 12 Court.”



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 14 **Joint Trial Readiness Conference Report (“TRC”) / Advance Trial Review Order (“ATRO”)**

15  
 16 In their TRC (ROA # 91), Plaintiff and Defendants described the nature of the case as  
 17 follows:

18 “This is a Declaratory Relief and Mandamus action filed by Plaintiffs Raymond Lutz and  
 19 Citizens Oversight, Inc. against the County of San Diego, Michael Vu in his capacity of the  
 20 Registrar of Voters, and Helen Robbins-Meyer in her capacity as Chief Administrative Officer of  
 21 the County of San Diego. Plaintiffs contend that the manner in which the County conducts the one  
 22 percent manual tally, as defined by Elections Code 336.5, does not meet the requirements of  
 23 Elections Code Section 15360.”

24 The parties identified the legal issues which are not in dispute as follows:

- 25 “1. Elections Code Sections 336.5 and 15360 are the operative provisions of the Elections
- 26 Code that define and govern the one percent manual tally.
- 27 2. Provisional voters are defined in Election Code Section 14310 - 14313.
- 28 3. Vote-by-mail voters are defined in Election Code Section 300.



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4. The one percent manual tally must be conducted and completed during the official canvass.

5. The purpose of the manual tally is to verify the accuracy of the automated count.”

The parties identified the legal issues which are in dispute as follows:

“1. The requirements imposed on elections officials by Elections Code Sections 336.5 and 15360.

2. Plaintiffs contend the above includes whether verifying the accuracy of the automated count should include the review, supervision and oversight of ballots on which white out or ballots were remade. Defendants contend this is not a "legal issue" to be addressed in this action.”

After the parties filed the TRC Report, the Court entered the ATRO. ROA # 90.

**Non-Jury Trial**



The parties are not entitled to a jury trial in view of the nature of the relief at issue.

**Motion for Non-Suit to Dismiss Defendant HELEN N. ROBBINS-MEYER (“ROBBINS-MEYER”)**

After the opening statement of Plaintiff’s counsel, Defendant ROBBINS-MEYER made a Motion for non-suit. The Court, after hearing arguments of counsel, GRANTED the Motion and dismissed ROBBINS-MEYER from this lawsuit.



**Witnesses and Exhibits at Trial**

Vu, Plaintiff, Mayer, Seiler, Wallis, LaVine, Logan and Rodewald testified to his / her recollection of events which took place years ago. The recollection of these witnesses have been influenced by their bias, prejudice or personal relationship with the parties involved in this case. If for no reason other than the passage of time, much less the absence of reliable corroboration, the





1 Court questions the capacity of the witnesses to accurately recollect and communicate his / her  
2 perception of the events. The witnesses have “testified untruthfully about some things but told the  
3 truth about others” and, accordingly, the Court has accepted the part it perceives to be true and has  
4 ignored the rest. CACI 107, 212.

5 Michal Vu: He is the County’s Registrar of Voters (“ROV”). He is responsible for overall  
6 direction and conduct of SD elections. He is responsible for “the implementation of law.” He was  
7 chief election official for the County of Cuyahoga in Ohio during the 2004 presidential election.  
8 He resigned from his position in Ohio though not because he was asked to do so following a  
9 controversy involving two staff. The two staff were prosecuted following the controversy. His  
10 current duties include application of his interpretation of the law. He is familiar with Election  
11 Code 15360. He described his options on how to conduct the 1% manual tally. Exh. “4” is the  
12 County’s policy manual – 1% manual tally. He admits that Exh. “4” does not reflect the  
13 “batching” method to conduct the 1% manual tally. The policy manual does not reflect the  
14 County’s practice of conducting the 1% manual tally by batching method. The County is in the  
15 process of updating the policy to reflect its practice of the batching method. Exh. “19” is the  
16 official results of County’s June 7, 2016 election. There were 775,930 ballots cast. There were  
17 1,523,251 registered voters. There were 285,000 ballots yet to be processed as of the end of  
18 election day. Provisional ballots are cast at polling places. There were 68,000 validated  
19 provisional ballots processed. There were 75,000 provisional ballots received. There were  
20 490,000 votes by mail (“VBM”) ballots received, the majority of which were received before the  
21 election. There were non-party partisan ballots placed in provisional ballots. The County’s  
22 practice is to not include provisional ballots in the 1% manual tally. The County appears to  
23 include in the “semifinal official” count, VBM ballots received on or before the election. The  
24 County received 489,610 VBM ballots, of which 256,685 were included in the 1% manual tally.  
25 The combination of the excluded VBM ballots and the provisional ballots numbered  
26 approximately 37% of the total votes cast which were not subject to the 1% manual tally. He  
27 excluded from the 1% manual tally VBM ballots received after the election and provisional ballots  
28 cast at polling places. The County uses “white out tape” on ballots, one purpose of which is to





1 identify an ineligible voter. The County created a non-partisan democratic ballot. The County  
2 does not have written procedures for the use of white out tape. The County does not keep records  
3 of the white out tape on ballots. The County secures and maintains the redacted white out taped  
4 ballots for 22 months for federal elections and for six months for local elections.” He was  
5 employed for less than a year before the election controversy occurred in Ohio. Exh. “140” is his  
6 CV. He described his duties as the County’s ROV. He’s been the County’s ROV since 2012. The  
7 County has 1,650,000 registered voters. 62% of the registered voters vote by mail. 775,000  
8 persons voted in the June election. He expects 1,200,000 persons to vote in the November  
9 election, with 1,552 precincts and 623 ballot types. He described the voluminous types of  
10 contests on the November ballot. Exh. “199” is a demonstrative sample ballot for the November  
11 election. He described the challenges with a two card ballot. He described the operational issues  
12 to manage the 7,000 to 8,000 poll workers to be hired for the November election. He described the  
13 process of issuing VBM ballots to voters. A VBM voter can only vote provisionally at the polling  
14 place after receiving a VBM ballot. 490,000 persons cast VBM ballots in the June election. He  
15 estimated that 675,000 to 725,000 persons will cast VBM ballots in the November election. Exh.  
16 “148” is the report of the provisional ballots cast in the June election. Mr. Vu testified and  
17 Exhibit 148 reflects that the County fully counted 51,427, or 68.2% of the provisional ballots.  
18 Exh. “148” also reflects persons who voted both by mail and a provisional ballot. Mr. Vu  
19 testified and Exhibit 148 reflects that the County partially counted 17,226, or 22.9%, of the  
20 provisional ballots. The County did not count 6,773 provisional ballots. When a voter voted both  
21 by mail and with a provisional ballot, the County counted the VBM ballot instead of a voter’s  
22 provisional ballot. The ROV employs 65 staff, and intends to hire 800 to 900 temporary workers.  
23 He expects to recruit 7,400 to 8,000 poll workers for the November election. There were 489,610  
24 VBM ballots of which 256,685 were included in the semi-final official canvass for the June  
25 election. The remaining approximately 233,000 VBM ballots were processed and counted during  
26 the official canvass. Exh. “146” is the County’s procedures for processing VBM ballots. The  
27 County trains the staff who process VBM ballots. Exh. “177” is a snap shot of the steps to process  
28 VBM ballots. The County expended 10,000 or more staff hours to process VBM ballots in the







1 June election. He estimates the County will mail more than 900,000 VBM ballots to voters prior  
2 to the November election. He described the process by which the County receives and counts the  
3 VBM ballots.

4 The Pitney Bowes “sorter” sorts batches of no more than 400 VBM envelopes as a form of  
5 quality assurance. The bar code on the envelopes are read and encoded into a memory card which  
6 is imported into the County’s voting system. VBM ballots are validated manually but processed  
7 with optical scanners. The County evaluates the signatures on VBM ballots but liberally construes  
8 the signatures in favor of counting the votes. The County begins to count VBM ballots 10  
9 business days before the election. He emphasized that the County counts every ballot cast by  
10 every eligible voter. He described the process by which the County re-makes a ballot. He  
11 explained why the County uses “white out tape.” He explained the County’s activities during the  
12 official canvass. He explained the “reconciliation of the voting precincts.” He explained the steps  
13 to avoid the risk of “double voting” by voters. He referred to section 15302 to describe the steps  
14 the County takes to complete the official canvass. The County has 30 days to certify the election.  
15 The County can count VBM ballots post marked no later than election day and received by the  
16 ROV within 3 days after the election. Exh. “171” is a diagram of how paper ballots and touch  
17 screen votes are counted. The County manually transfers touch screen votes to paper ballots.  
18 Provisional ballots are processed after election day but before the end of the official canvass  
19 period. Exh. “181” is a demonstrative video of ballots being processed by the Pitney Bowes sorter  
20 in batches of 400 envelopes. The sorter outstacks or suspends ballots with a perceived defect. The  
21 sorter sorts the envelopes at the rate of 24,000 envelopes per hour. After election night, the  
22 County expends 10,000 or more hours to process VBM ballots. He expects the volume of VBM  
23 ballots to be processed in November during the official canvass to be greater than the 235,000  
24 VBM ballots processed during the official canvass of the June election. Exh. “147” is the  
25 County’s procedures for processing the provisional ballots. Exh. “178” is a summary of the  
26 County’s steps to process provisional ballots, the purpose of which is to insure that the County  
27 counts every provisional ballot. Exh. “176” is a provisional ballot envelope. The County uses 100  
28 staff to process provisional ballots, most of whom are temporary staff. The County conducts a





1 background check of temporary staff. The County completes the process of counting provisional  
2 ballots by the time the results are certified. The County's processes are intended to balance the  
3 integrity of the voting system with the ROV's ability to count the votes. The volume of the VBM  
4 ballots are larger than provisional ballots; however, it takes more time to process the provisional  
5 ballots. He described the purpose and process of the 1% manual tally. The 1% manual tally must  
6 start as soon as possible after the election in order to timely certify the results. Exh. "179" is the  
7 1% manual tally sheets for the June election. The County expends thousands of staff hours to  
8 complete the 1% manual tally. The 1% manual tally counted 7,800 ballots. The 1% manual tally  
9 counted ballots from randomly selected precincts as well as additional precincts. The 1% manual  
10 tally did not reveal any "issues." The County does not include VBM ballots not processed by  
11 election night in the 1% manual tally. The County does not include provisional ballots in the 1%  
12 manual tally. His first presidential election as the County's ROV was 2008. He described the  
13 severe impact on the County's ability to certify the November election results if the County  
14 included VBM ballots and provisional ballots in the 1% manual tally. He questioned the impact  
15 on the County's ability to complete an accurate count of the vote if required to include VBM and  
16 provisional ballots in the 1% manual tally. The County counts every vote, regardless of the type of  
17 ballot cast. The County reserves white space on the ballots to provide for additional languages as  
18 necessary, pursuant to the 1965 voting rights act. There were 490,000 VBM ballots cast in the  
19 June election. He agreed with the trend that more voters are voting by mail. 75,000 ballots were  
20 cast provisionally in the June election, and about 68,000 were ultimately validated and officially  
21 cast. 256,000 of the VBM ballots were processed as part of the semi-final unofficial canvass. The  
22 1% manual tally did not include 37 % of the total votes cast in the June election. Hypothetically, if  
23 a non-partisan voter cast a non-partisan democratic ballot and the poll worker mistakenly placed  
24 the ballot in a provisional envelope it would not have been included in the semi-final official  
25 canvass but rather would have been processed and counted during the canvass following the  
26 election. He decided that the 1% manual tally would be changed from the batching method to the  
27 precinct method, after he received Plaintiffs' lawsuit. The County's procedures did not include  
28







1 processing the 1% manual tally of VBM ballots by batch. He expects to hire more than 7,000 pol.  
2 workers for the November election.

3       **Raymond Lutz**: He is a citizen and registered voter in SD County. COI is a 501c3 non-  
4 profit organization, the purpose of which is to encourage citizen oversight of SD County elections.  
5 His education includes a master's degree in electronics. His work experience includes document  
6 imaging technology. Exh. "58" is his CV. He knows Vu. His participation in overseeing SD  
7 County elections dates back a number of years to 2008. He has developed a cooperative working  
8 relationship with Vu. He discovered in or about 2010 the County's practice of conducting the 1%  
9 manual tally, although the practice was not entirely clear to him. He video recorded the County's  
10 selection of the ballots which were the subject of the 1% manual tally for the June 2016 election.  
11 The County had 1,522 precincts for the June Presidential Primary Election. The County will have  
12 1,552 precincts for the November Presidential General Election. "Batches" are mixed precincts  
13 which are chosen from 32 areas. Batches must have a report of all the precincts from which the  
14 ballots are counted in the 1% manual tally. Vu chose only 8 precincts, instead of 16 precincts, to  
15 develop the set of VBM batches to be manually tallied. He objected to Vu's practice. Exh's "12 -  
16 14." He photographed a list of the batches chosen by Vu to conduct the 1% manual tally, although  
17 he did not receive a "batch mode report." He filed this lawsuit when he discovered that Wu  
18 decided not to conduct a 1% manual tally of all of the mail and provisional ballots cast in the June  
19 2016 election. He considers himself to be a citizen advocate. He studied the election process used  
20 by the County in 2008 by evaluating votes cast in a sampling of 5 of the 85 precincts. He  
21 prepared a report of election procedures including the 1% manual tally from the 2008 election. He  
22 concluded from his review that he needed the "snap shot file" from the County. He conducted  
23 another review of the 2014 election in "all counties in California" and, once again, realized he  
24 needed the "snap shot file." In 2014, he made a request from the registrar of voters in all counties.  
25 In his opinion, the County conducts a 1% manual tally without including VBM ballots. The ROV  
26 conducts a selection meeting the day after the election, selects the precincts and the batches. The  
27 ROV receives boxes of ballots from the polling places. Exh. "64" demonstrates the start and stop  
28 dates and times of the County's teams conducting the 1% manual tally of the selected precincts,




1 the source of which is data created by the County. Exh’s “49 – 52.” The County’s 1% manual  
2 tally did not start until June 27 with multiple stretches over the 30 day period in which the County  
3 did no work. In his opinion, the County could have conducted the 1% manual tally more  
4 efficiently and started the tally earlier than June 27. He conducted a roster review of the County’s  
5 teams who participated in the 1% manual tally as well as a review of the votes cast from a  
6 sampling of 5 precincts. He reviewed and compared the 1% manual tally results with the snap shot  
7 file, which did not match. In his opinion, the 1% manual tally detects simple tabulator errors as  
8 well as possible central tabulator hacking which could result in a shift of as many as 10,000 votes  
9 from one candidate to another. He requested the legislative history for the senate bill culminating  
10 in section 15360, from the secretary of state’s office. Exh. “59.” His question is whether the  
11 legislature intended to include VBM and provisional ballots in the 1% manual tally. He has never  
12 been a poll worker or an election official. He votes by mail at this time. The last time he visited a  
13 poll was 2014. He has owned and operated multiple businesses, including Creative Minds Inc. He  
14 started COI in or about 2006, which is connected to the east county democratic party. He is the  
15 only officer and director and of COI. COI has due paying members. He is the sole operating  
16 manager of COI. An audit is “an historical review of something that happened.” He is not  
17 familiar with the regulations adopted outside of the election code. He did not participate in the  
18 legislative process to amend Section 15360. He corresponded with Vu and other registrars of  
19 voters throughout California on the subject of the 1% manual tally. Exh’s “9 – 11.” He  
20 understood that not all ballots would be included in the “subset” of the votes for the 1% manual  
21 tally. In 2016, he again requested a snapshot of the “subset” of the votes for the 1% manual tally.  
22 Exh. “11.” The County provided him with a snapshot of the “subset” of the votes for 1% manual  
23 tally of the June 7, 2016 election. He described his understanding of the process by which the  
24 County receives and records VBM ballots. His description appears to be reasonable and informed,  
25 although critical, in part, of the County’s process. The County processes provisional ballots last,  
26 after first having processed VBM ballots. In his opinion, the ROV is required to include all of the  
27 provisional ballots. “Batch” is defined in section 15360. Section 15360(a) (B)(ii) states: ““batch”  
28 means a set of ballots tabulated by the voting system devices, for which the voting system can





1 produce a report of the votes cast.” He admits section 15360 does not refer to “all,” “audit” or  
2 “”provisional ballots.” He described his understanding of “hashing” as part of the County’s  
3 security system. He believes that an outside hacker can hack into the County’s security system.  
4 He has not witnessed any election fraud in the County. He considers the County’s failure to follow  
5 his interpretation of the law to be a form of election fraud. He is not aware of anyone hacking into  
6 the County’s “vote tabulation system.” In the SAC, at par. 36, Plaintiffs allege that the County  
7 should include all VBM and provisional ballots in the 1% manual tally. A “snap shot file” is a  
8 snap shot of all votes the County counted. It was a big file ... 200 megabytes. One purpose of the  
9 snap shot was to evaluate whether an “internal hacker” had manipulated the election results. Exh.  
10 “56” is the snap shot he received from the County of the election results tabulated as of June 8,  
11 2016 at 3:00 pm. He received Exh. “56” just before the County conducted the “random draw.”  
12 There are counties which conduct the “random draw” as much as two months before the election  
13 which alerts potential hackers of the precincts not to manipulate, to avoid detection. The County  
14 conducts the 1% manual tally after the random draw takes place.

15 **Erin Mayer**: She is chief departmental officer in charge of the 1% manual tally. She  
16 supervises Diane Elsheikh. She has occupied her current position for 2 ½ years. She described the  
17 procedure she has followed to conduct the 1% manual tally. The procedure changed from batching  
18 to precincts after the County received a demand from Lutz. The precincts consisted of the  
19 precincts randomly polled. She participated in a lot of discussions with Lutz during the random  
20 draw. She referred to Exh’s “49 – 52,” the subject of which is the County’s 1% manual tally after  
21 the June 7, 2016 election. On June 13, her team started the process of counting the poll ballots.  
22 On June 21, her team started the process of counting the touch screen ballots. On June 27, her  
23 team started the process of counting the VBM from the precincts chosen in the random draw. The  
24 1% manual tally did not include VBM ballots from precincts not selected in the random draw. The  
25 1% manual tally did not include VBM ballots received by the County after the June election.  
26 Exh.”50” is the tally of the votes received from the precincts. Exh. “52” is the tally of the touch  
27 screen votes. The County includes 100% of the touch screen ballots in the 1% manual tally. The  
28 County tabulates the paper ballots followed by the VBM ballots. She denies any “problems” with



1 the “paper trail” of the votes in the June election. She agrees that the County is required to possess  
2 a paper trail of the touch screen ballots. She described the “back end” of the processing of the  
3 ballots which takes place before the beginning of the 1% manual tally. She described the technical  
4 services necessary to process the ballots. The County can re-make a paper trail to memorialize the  
5 touch screen ballots. The County started the 1% manual tally by batch before switching to  
6 precincts.



7 **Deborah Seiler**: She is retired from the County. Previously, she was the ROV for the  
8 County. She described her elections experience as reflected in her CV. Exh. “138.” She  
9 contributed to the development of elections legislation in California. She has acted as an election  
10 observer in other countries like, for example, the former Soviet Union. Her credentials /  
11 qualifications are impressive. She described her duties as ROV for the County. She described her  
12 understanding of the post-election 1% manual tally which has been in effect since 1965. The  
13 initial purpose of the 1% manual tally was to verify the accuracy of the “coding process.” There  
14 have been multiple amendments to the 1% manual tally legislation. She encouraged the expansion  
15 of the 1% manual tally legislation. She participated in drafting the 1986 legislation amendment.  
16 She proposed a re-structuring of the “whole elections code.” She proposed that the 1% manual  
17 tally be re-located into the “canvas procedures.” The 1% manual tally was not contemplated to be  
18 a part of the re-count procedures. She referred to Elections Code section 336.5 which defines the  
19 “1% manual tally,” the drafting of which she participated in. She described her understanding of  
20 “verify” in context of the 1% manual tally. A manual tally is required to be performed during the  
21 official canvas. Exh’s “100 – 103” are the 2006 proposed amendments known as Senate Bill 1235.  
22 In her opinion, the absence of provisional ballots from the ultimate legislation is significant. She  
23 denies that the word ‘all’ appears in section 15360. A reference to “all” and “provisional ballots”  
24 were stricken from the proposed amendments. Exh’s “104, 180.” The 2008 election was the first  
25 election she presided over as the County’s ROV after AB 2769 was enacted. She included some,  
26 but not all, of the VBM ballots in the 1% manual tally. She made minor changes to the procedures  
27 for the 1% manual tally after the enactment of AB 2769. She was familiar with the enactment of  
28 section 15360.5, as urgency legislation, in 2010. Exh. “105.” In her opinion, the application of




1 section 15360.5 was limited to 4 specific counties. She described her understanding of the options  
2 available to counties to conduct the 1% manual tally. Exh. "106" is the 2011 proposed amendment  
3 to section 15360 which extended section 15360.5 to all counties. The 2011 amendment was  
4 financially important to, and was supported by, the County. The County based the 1% manual  
5 tally on the semi-final official canvass. The inclusion of "all ballots" including VBM and  
6 provisional ballots in the 1% manual tally would have worked a financial and administrative  
7 hardship on the County. She characterized the Secretary of State's proposal (Exh. "109") as "an  
8 underground regulation" which the County successfully challenged. The County devoted 100  
9 hours or more to respond to the accusations asserted by Lutz in 2010. Exh's "62, 110." She  
10 expressed her opinion of the remedies available to a citizen who challenges the integrity of the  
11 election results. She is not aware of any evidence that anyone has hacked into the County's voting  
12 system. She described the purpose of placing the "source codes" in escrow. The computer vote  
13 count program is deposited with the Secretary of State's office. Within 5 days after the election  
14 results are certified, any voter may demand a re-count at the challenger's expense; however, if the  
15 re-count is successful, the expense is reimbursed to the challenger. Any voter may file an election  
16 contest in Court. In 2006, Senator Debra Bowen was the sponsor of SB 1235. The Court takes  
17 judicial notice of the legislative history of section 15360. Exh. "59." The history indicates support  
18 to include absentee and provisional ballots in the 1% manual tally. She considers the statements in  
19 the August 30<sup>th</sup> letter from the Secretary of State Bruce McPherson (Exhibit 59, p. 45) and the  
20 Enrolled Bill Memorandum to Governor dated 9/7/06 (Exhibit 59, p. 37-38) that SB 1235 requires  
21 elections officials to include absentee and provisional ballots to be an error. Provisional ballots are  
22 cast at the polls.

23 **Charlie Wallis**: He has been the principal IT analyst with the County for 26 years. He  
24 manages information technology for the ROV. He is responsible for supplying the information to  
25 the team who conduct the 1% manual tally. He supervised the information services for the June 7,  
26 2106 election. He pulled the batches of ballots cast at the polling place and by mail. He is not  
27 aware of any issue with the voter verified paper trail. He first pulled the boxes for the polling  
28 place ballots. He next pulled the VBM ballots. He described the process to pull the precinct







1 boxes. He delivered the precinct boxes to the 1% manual tally. The reference to “deck” and  
2 “batch” are synonymous. The boxes are secured in the ROV’s office. He retrieved the VBM  
3 ballots from the chosen precincts, which took 40 staff working a full week to complete. He is  
4 familiar with the unofficial results of the June election. Exh. “56.” He posted the unofficial results  
5 on the internet. He agrees that the unofficial results should match the computer reports. Exh. “44”  
6 is a report which “identifies how many cards for a particular precinct are in a deck.” There is a  
7 comparable report for the VBM ballots. The County has a short period of time to certify the  
8 election. There were more provisional ballots in the June election than he expected. The County  
9 received more than 70,000 provisional ballots. He has noted an increase in VBM voting. He  
10 described the responsibilities he is performing to prepare for the upcoming November election.  
11 The County changes the precincts from one election to the next. He has been working 6 to 7 days  
12 per week, 12 hours per day, to prepare for the November election. He described the voter  
13 registration system. He described the election management system. He described the vote  
14 tabulation system. He described the global election management system (“GEM”). The County’s  
15 election systems must be certified by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State and the Federal  
16 Election Commission (“FEC”) has certified the County’s use of GEM. The Secretary of State  
17 provides the County with use procedures, including security, for GEM. He disagreed with Lutz  
18 that the security procedures for GEM are not available to the public. He described the hardware  
19 components for GEM. Exh. “155.” The server of the County’s GEM is not connected to the  
20 internet. He described the County’s security for GEM. Since 2008, security for GEM has been  
21 “hardened.” The security contemplates protection if the server is stolen. He described the  
22 County’s touch screens. Exh. “154.” Touch screens are available for voters with special needs.  
23 He described the County’s security for the touch screens. The touch screens contain a memory  
24 card. 1,000 or fewer voters cast ballots using the touch screen in the June election. He described  
25 the function of voting on the touch screens. He described the paper trail generated by voting on  
26 the touch screens. He described the optical scan device to scan ballots and upload results to the  
27 County’s central tabulator. Exh. “152.” The County sets up approximately 160 optical scan  
28 devices on election night. He described the function of the optical scan device. He described the




1 purpose of the memory card for the optical scan device. The optical scan device generates a paper  
2 trail. He described the “ender card” which is run through the scanner. Exh. “158.” Exh. “190”  
3 demonstrates the paper tape generated by the scanner operator. He explained examples of why  
4 some ballots cannot be scanned. Exh.”150” is a diagram of the County’s election night central  
5 count floor. He described the roles performed by the staff depicted in the diagram. He estimates  
6 that the process for the upcoming election will take longer than usual. Exh. “151” is a video which  
7 reflects the County’s “ballot inspection” during a past election. He described the function of the  
8 “serial digy box” and “os device” depicted in Exh. “153.” He described the function of the “start  
9 card,” referring to Exh. “157” for demonstrative purposes only. Each ballot is coded to a precinct.  
10 The os and tsx units are tested for use prior to the election. Exh. “159” is a test card to make sure  
11 the units are functioning before the election. After running the hardware tests, the County  
12 performs a full logic and accuracy test on the system, all of which takes place under his  
13 supervision. He described the series of tests he supervises to test the 623 ballot types. The County  
14 conducted approximately 20,000 tests prior to the June election. The test data is transmitted to  
15 GEM. He successfully completed logic and accuracy testing prior to the June election. The pre  
16 June election tests took approximately 10 days. The tests are conducted prior to every election.  
17 He recognizes Lutz but does not believe Lutz has taken advantage of the opportunity available to  
18 the public to observe the testing. Exh. “175” is the results bulletin for the 1% manual tally of polls  
19 ballots for the June election. The County’s GEM generated Exh. “175.” The County generates  
20 different reports for poll ballots and VBM ballots. The June election generated 600 to 700 decks.  
21 He described the process to produce a report for each deck. The County used GEM to process a  
22 re-count challenge within the last 12 years. The County’s count was upheld. He described the  
23 process by which the integrity of the ballot tabulations is preserved. He described how the hash  
24 value of the GEM would change if the security system were breached. He is not aware of any  
25 manipulation of the County’s GEM. In his opinion, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to hack  
26 into the County’s GEM, alter data and manipulate election results. He is involved in the quality  
27 control process of re-making ballots. He described the County’s use of “white out tape.” He  
28 described the “uniform counting standards” which the County applies, if necessary, to use “white







1 out tape.” Exh. “149.” The County submits the provisional ballots to a verification process.  
2 “VVPAT” stands for voter verified paper audit trail. The County is required to retain the paper  
3 trail under the Elections Code.

4 **Jill LaVine**: She has been the ROV for Sacramento County for 13 years. She described  
5 her duties as ROV. Her elections career dates back to 1987. “CACEO” stands for California  
6 Association of Clerks and Elections Officials. Sacramento has 900,000 eligible voters and  
7 733,000 registered voters. Sacramento employs 34 staff and 2,800 poll workers. Sacramento will  
8 add up to 200 temporary staff for the upcoming election. She is familiar with the 1% manual tally.  
9 Sacramento conducts a random selection of precincts for the 1% manual tally. The January 1,  
10 2007 amendment to section 15360 added VBM ballots. Exh. “109” is a directive to county clerk  
11 registrar of voters (“ccrov”) throughout California on the subject of the post-election manual tally.  
12 The 2010 option to four counties was to choose between conducting the 1% manual tally by either  
13 batch or precinct process. Sacramento continued to conduct the 1% manual tally by the precinct  
14 process. Sacramento’s procedures are consistent with the conclusion in Exh. “107” not to include  
15 VBM ballots or provisional ballots in the 1% manual tally. She described the process by which  
16 Sacramento counts VBM ballots and provisional ballots. Sacramento counts the provisional  
17 ballots at or near the end. To include all VBM ballots would create a logistical problem for  
18 Sacramento. She is not aware that Sacramento’s voting system has been hacked. 340,000 persons  
19 voted in Sacramento’s June election. 67% of Sacramento’s voters voted by mail. Sacramento has  
20 not used the batching method to conduct the 1% manual tally. It is administratively more  
21 convenient for Sacramento to use the precinct method. Exh. “68” is Sacramento’s 2014 report of  
22 the results of the 1% manual tally. The report reflects errors that did not match the computer count  
23 on election night. Exh. “69” is Sacramento’s June 2016 report of the results of the 1% manual  
24 tally. The report reflects errors that did not match the computer count on election night. In both  
25 instances, Sacramento made the corrections in the official certified results. She described how  
26 Sacramento could conduct the 1% manual tally by including VBM ballots and provisional ballots.  
27 Sacramento would need to add staff and incur additional resources to include VBM ballots and  
28 provisional ballots. She denied that the batching method would assist Sacramento to conduct the





1 1% manual tally with the inclusion of VBM ballots and provisional ballots. Sacramento had not  
2 yet counted 136,000 ballots as of election night, none of which were subject to the 1% manual  
3 tally. Sacramento starts to count VBM ballots as early as 10 days before the election. Sacramento  
4 strives to include as many VBM ballots as possible into the 1% manual tally. Sacramento included  
5 200,000 VBM ballots in the 1% manual tally. She explained the reasons for the discrepancy in the  
6 official certified results from the semi-final official results after the 1% manual tally. As reflected  
7 in Exh. "69", the discrepancy also arose from a break down in the scanning operation during the  
8 June election.

9 **Dean Logan:** He is the L.A. County ROV county clerk. Exh. "139" is his CV which  
10 reflects 25 years of elections experience. He described his duties as L.A.'s ROV. L.A. has  
11 5,042,000 registered voters, of which 2,026,000 voted in the June election. 772,000 persons voted  
12 by mail. 271,000 persons cast provisional ballots. He described the reasons why persons cast  
13 provisional ballots. He expects L.A. to receive more VBM ballots in the November election. L.A.  
14 employs 841 staff in the ROV office, all of whom participate in the election process (although  
15 L.A. will add another 500 temporary staff for the November election). L.A. will use 22,000 poll  
16 workers for the November election. L.A. included 387,000 VBM ballots in the semi-final results.  
17 334,000 VBM ballots were not included in the 1% manual tally. L.A. assigns 150 staff to count  
18 VBM ballots. He described the process by which L.A. counts VBM ballots, which he also  
19 characterized as "labor intensive." He described the training L.A. provides to the staff to count  
20 VBM ballots and the provisional ballots. L.A. staff devoted 57,000 hours to count VBM ballots as  
21 of the June election. L.A. devoted an additional 12,000 staff hours to count VBM ballots received  
22 after the June election. The official results included 236,788 of the total 271,000 provisional  
23 ballots in the official results. L.A. starts to process provisional ballots the day after the election.  
24 He described the process by which L.A. counts the provisional ballots. 150 to 400 staff counted  
25 the provisional ballots cast in the June election. The processing of provisional ballots are more  
26 labor intensive than the processing of VBM ballots. L.A. staff devoted 61,000 hours to process the  
27 provisional ballots. He described his understanding of the 1% manual tally, a process which starts  
28 the day after the election. In his opinion, the inclusion of VBM ballots and provisional ballots in





1 the 1% manual tally would delay the certification of the official results. He described the process  
2 by which the 1% manual tally takes place after notice is provided to the public. L.A. devoted 55  
3 staff to complete the 1% manual tally and 7,500 staff hours to count 20,217 ballots in the June  
4 election. The 20,217 represents 1% of the total 2,026,068 ballots cast in the June election. L.A.  
5 uses the precinct method to conduct the 1% manual tally. L.A. did not include VBM ballots that  
6 were processed after the election, and did not include provisional ballots, in the 1% manual tally.  
7 He's been employed with L.A. ROV office since 2006. Prior to 2007, L.A. did not include VBM  
8 ballots in the random draw. L.A. has not included the provisional ballots in the 1% manual tally.  
9 He described the reasons why L.A. has not included provisional ballots in the 1% manual tally.  
10 The 2012 amendment allowed counties to choose between the batch or precinct method to conduct  
11 the 1% manual tally. L.A. continues to not include all VBM ballots in the 1% manual tally. The  
12 recent amendment to section 15360 allows VBM ballots received up to 3 days after the election to  
13 be counted in the election results. He described the additional delay and costs to include all ballots  
14 cast in the 1% manual tally, and still be able to certify the official results. He received multiple  
15 emails from Lutz on the subject of the 1% manual tally for the June election. Exh. "195."  
16 12,000,000 persons reside in L.A. county. He is not aware of any person hacking into L.A.'s  
17 voting system. His departmental budget is more than \$178,000,000 per year. L.A. has 5,000,000  
18 eligible voters. 722,000 persons voted by mail. 271,000 provisional ballots were validated and  
19 included in the certified returns. 387,000 of the 722,000 VBM ballots were included in the semi-  
20 final official results. L.A. sorts VBM ballots by precinct prior to tabulation. He described the  
21 process by which L.A. secures the ballots. L.A. conducts the 1% random draw the day after the  
22 election. The actual 1% manual tally starts 2 or 3 days after the election. L.A. only includes VBM  
23 ballots which were both received and counted as of the election, in the 1% manual tally. L.A.  
24 takes 8 – 10 days to conduct the 1% manual tally. He described the process by which L.A. would  
25 conduct the 1% manual tally if all ballots cast were included; however, he questions whether L.A.  
26 could achieve the 1% manual tally within the statutorily required time frame, to certify the official  
27 results. He described L.A.'s vote tabulation system, components of which are the Inka vote and  
28 Inka vote plus. The Secretary of State certifies L.A.'s voting system. L.A.'s voting system is



1 capable of processing VBM ballots by batch. He described his understanding of the batching  
2 methodology and, agreed that, arguably, a precinct is a batch.


3 **Julie Rodewald (through her deposition taken on September 23, 2016 – Exh’s “196,**  
4 **197”)**: She retired in 2014 as the county clerk recorder for San Luis Obispo County after 20 years.  
5 She described her duties to include “conducting elections.” She also served as the ROV for San  
6 Luis Obispo. She was a member of CACEO. She described her understanding of the purpose of  
7 the 1% manual tally, and the process by which San Luis Obispo conducts the 1% manual tally.  
8 She described her understanding of the amendments to section 15360. San Luis Obispo did not  
9 perform the random draw until a week after the election to allow more VBM ballots to be included  
10 and did not include any provisional ballots in the 1% manual tally. In her opinion, the law did not  
11 require San Luis Obispo to include provisional ballots in the 1% manual tally. San Luis Obispo  
12 was one of the four counties which were the subject of section 15360.5. The purpose of the 1%  
13 manual tally is “to verify the automated count ... to finish the official canvas within the 28 days.”  
14 The 2011 amendment permitted all counties to tally VBM ballots by batch. San Luis Obispo did  
15 not change its practice to include, or not include, VBM ballots in the 1% manual tally. She is not  
16 aware that San Luis Obispo’s voting system has been hacked. San Luis Obispo started the 1%  
17 manual tally one week after the election. San Luis Obispo included VBM ballots which had been  
18 received and processed as of the election in the 1% manual tally. San Luis Obispo has 145 polling  
19 precincts. 12 precincts were selected for the 1% manual tally. 60,228 persons cast VBM ballots in  
20 the November 2014 election, and approximately 90 - 95% were processed before San Luis Obispo  
21 started the 1% manual tally. San Luis Obispo could have included the provisional ballots, like  
22 VBM ballots, in the 1% manual tally. She observed that the volume of VBM ballots and  
23 provisional ballots cast continued to increase. The provisional ballots were the last ballots to be  
24 counted before the results were certified.

25 **Phillip Stark**: He is a professor of statistics at UC Berkley, and has been since 1988. His  
26 education includes a Ph.D. in earth science from UCSD. Exh. “53” is his CV. His qualifications  
27 are adequate, if not superior. He identified the materials he reviewed to form and express his  
28 opinions. He is familiar with Election Code 15360 including AB 985 effective January 1, 2012.





1 He has reviewed the legislative history of SB 1235 effective January 1, 2007. Secretary of State  
2 Deborah Bowen appointed him to a committee to review post-election audit standards of the  
3 State's voting systems. He has spoken to 10 to 15 ROV's throughout the State. The foundation on  
4 which he based his opinions are adequate. He is familiar with the 1% manual tally which he  
5 characterized as a "quality control check" on election results. He has participated in a "risk  
6 limiting audit," the purpose of which is to confirm the confidence in the election result. The  
7 framework of the audit is based on a statistical model which confirms that the "outcome is  
8 correct." The risk of the audit varies depending upon the degree of confidence that the outcome is  
9 correct. He emphasized that a "robust chain of custody" is imperative to the reliability of the  
10 result. He identified the counties, including Orange, in the State which have utilized his audit. His  
11 bias, if any, is to promote election integrity, which is why he has chosen to testify without  
12 compensation. He identified the types of errors which the 1% manual tally can detect which  
13 includes whether the central tabulating system has been compromised. He described his  
14 understanding of the batching method and the precinct method to conduct the 1% manual tally. In  
15 his opinion, the batching method provides a higher statistical advantage to detect errors in the  
16 election result. In his opinion, it's important that all votes cast have been counted before the  
17 random selection / 1% manual tally occurs. In his opinion, the 1% manual tally conducted on a  
18 sampling of ballots instead of all votes cast, undermines, from a statistical perspective, the  
19 "accuracy of the voting system results." In his opinion, the County's random selection is, from a  
20 statistical perspective, flawed. He described his understanding of provisional ballots. In his  
21 opinion, the omission of ballots cast, including provisional ballots and VBM ballots, impairs the  
22 ability of the 1% manual tally to detect errors. In his opinion, the manner in which the County  
23 conducts the 1% manual tally creates a "frame bias." He has reviewed Plaintiff's SAC in this case  
24 as well as pertinent legislation connected to section 15360. He has not reviewed the County's  
25 procedures for processing VBM and provisional ballots. He has not participated in an audit of the  
26 County's 1% manual tally. He is not familiar with the County's GEM to process voting results.  
27 He performed election calculations relating to *Bush v. Gore*. He agreed that the official canvas  
28 includes elements other than the 1% manual tally. He agreed that he is not familiar with all of the





1 requirements of the official canvas. His focus is limited to the completion of the 1% manual tally.  
2 He agreed that a risk limiting audit is different than the 1% manual tally, which have very different  
3 goals. The goal of a risk limiting audit is to confirm the accuracy of the election results. He  
4 disagreed that a risk limiting audit is similar to a recount procedure, though he characterized the  
5 1% manual tally to be “like an intelligent incremental recount.” He generally agreed that the  
6 “broad” goals of both a risk limiting audit and the 1% manual tally is to check that the election  
7 results are correct. He agreed that the 1% manual tally is not a recount. He agreed that the ROV is  
8 required to report discrepancies detected from the 1% manual tally to the Secretary of State. L.A.  
9 and San Francisco are developing their own vote tabulating systems. The Elections Code does not  
10 require that jurisdictions perform a risk limiting audit. In his opinion, the 1% manual tally is an  
11 ineffective and inefficient means to confirm election results. In his opinion, the 1% manual tally  
12 has a small chance of detecting errors in the election results. In his opinion, a risk limiting audit  
13 has up to a 90% chance of detecting errors in the election results. He agreed that the 1% manual  
14 tally measures, although ineffectively and inefficiently, the accuracy of the election count. The  
15 pilot program he participated in conducted risk limiting audits in elections in eleven counties in  
16 2011 – 2012. The audits used a software program other than the counties’ existing voting system  
17 software program. The most common tabulation error is, in his experience, the misinterpretation  
18 of voter ballots, or voter intent. He is not familiar with the voter guidelines promulgated by the  
19 Secretary of State. He is not familiar with the County’s procedures to test whether ballots are  
20 scanned properly. He agreed that a quality control system should reduce errors in the ballots  
21 counted. He has not reviewed the County’s 1% manual tally results for the June 2016 election. In  
22 reviewing Exh. “51,” he identified discrepancies in the scanned count and the 1% manual tally in  
23 the June election. In his opinion, the entire election audit system needs an overhaul. He agreed  
24 that the current voting system does not require a risk limiting audit. He is not familiar with the  
25 term “semi-final official” canvas as reflected in the Elections Code. David Jefferson was the  
26 chairperson of the post-election audit standards working group. He recognized Dean Logan to be  
27 L.A. County’s ROV. He identified the existing elements of the official canvas. In his opinion, the  
28 existing elements of the official canvas, including the 1% manual tally, are “not enough.” In his



1 opinion, the 1% manual tally as a “double check” is not as good as a risk limiting audit. He  
 2 assumed that the County, like other counties, has a quality control system in tabulating votes. He  
 3 described his understanding of the manner in which the County conducts its “random draw.” He  
 4 has no opinion on the accuracy of the results of the County’s June election. To be a reliable  
 5 accuracy indicator, the random draw should occur after the results of the election are known. He  
 6 expects that the risk-limiting audit will be the next generation of audits in the State’s election  
 7 procedures.

8

9 **Plaintiffs’ FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION for DECLARATORY RELIEF**

10

11 Declaratory relief is a proper remedy. The purpose of a declaratory judgment is to serve  
 12 some practical end in “quieting or stabilizing an uncertain or disputed jural relation.” *In re*  
 13 *Claudia E.* (2008) 163 Cal. App. 4th 627, 633 (declaration that Department of Social Services not  
 14 complying with statutory time requirements for juvenile removal proceedings). Another purpose  
 15 is to liquidate doubts with respect to uncertainties or controversies which might otherwise result in  
 16 subsequent litigation. *Id.* “The proper interpretation of a statute is a particularly appropriate  
 17 subject for judicial resolution.” *Id.* Judicial economy strongly supports the use of declaratory  
 18 relief to avoid duplicative actions to challenge an agency’s statutory interpretation or alleged  
 19 policies. *Id.* The remedy of declarative relief is cumulative and does not restrict any other remedy  
 20 such that it is wrong for a court to decline a declaration on the ground that another remedy is  
 21 available. *Id.* at 633-634.


22 In their trial brief (ROA #92), at pages 4 – 6, Plaintiffs assert:

23 “Election Code section 15360 describes the 1% manual tally audit procedure. This  
 24 provision begins as follows:

25 15360(a) During the official canvass of every election in which a voting system is used, the  
 26 official conducting the election shall conduct a public manual tally of the ballots tabulated by those  
 27 devices, including vote by mail ballots, using either of the following methods:

28 (1) (A) A public manual tally of the ballots, including vote by mail ballots, cast in 1 percent of the






1 precincts chosen at random by the elections official. If 1 percent of the precincts is less than one  
2 whole precinct, the tally shall be conducted in one precinct chosen at random by the elections  
3 official.

4 Section 15360(a) requires that "[d]uring the official canvass of every election in which a  
5 voting system is used, the official conducting the election shall conduct a public manual tally of  
6 the ballots tabulated by those devices, including VBM ballots." This process is called the 1%  
7 manual tally. The purpose of the 1% manual tally is "to verify the accuracy of the automated  
8 count." Section 336.5.

9 Section 15360 clearly states that "not less than 1 percent of the VBM ballots cast" must be  
10 included in the 1% manual tally. Section 15360(a)(2)(B)(i). This quantity must be calculated  
11 based on the total number of vote by mail ballots cast, not the number of vote by mail ballots  
12 counted to date. 1% of the total number of ballots counted at that point is less than 1% of the total  
13 number of ballots cast and ultimately counted after that point. Thus, including a mere 1% of the  
14 total number of ballots counted to date is in direct violation of the requirement that "not less than  
15 1% of the VBM ballots cast in the election" be counted. Section 215360(a)(2)(B)(i).

16 The stated purpose of the 1% tally, "to verify the accuracy of the automated count,"  
17 supports this conclusion. Section 336.5. The legislative history of Section 15360 also supports this  
18 conclusion. "In 2006, Elections Code 15360 was amended to require that all vote by mail ballots  
19 be included in the 1% manual tally by precinct. This requirement resulted in over 540 additional  
20 staff hours to complete the manual tally process and approximately 12,000 in additional costs for  
21 each election...." 06/03/11 - Senate Elections and Constitutional Amendments, 2011 Cal Stat. Ch.  
22 52. Clearly, all vote by mail ballots have to be counted. The onerous nature of this requirement  
23 led the legislators to add the option to manually tally VBM ballots separately, in batches, to  
24 ensure, that all of them could be counted efficiently. Id. The proponents of AB707 state the intent  
25 clearly: "The votes on absentee ballots are no less valid or important than the votes cast at the  
26 polling place, and the potential for the vote to be incorrectly tabulated on an absentee ballot is just  
27 as likely as a vote cast in a traditional polling booth. Therefore, it makes no sense to exclude  
28 absentee ballots, provisional ballots and ballots cast at satellite locations from the 1% manual tally.



1 By excluding them from the manual tally, there is no way to verify that the votes cast on them are  
2 being recorded accurately. Moreover, in the event that counties are authorized to conduct an all-  
3 mail election, this provision would ensure that the manual tally is still conducted in those  
4 counties." (Exhibit 54, page 3) Further support was provided by the then-serving Secretary of  
5 State Bruce McPherson (served from March 2005 - December 2006): "This proposal also requires  
6 a county election official to include all ballots cast in a precinct in the 1% manual tally. This  
7 means that a county will need to include any ballots cast at the polls, via absentee ballot,  
8 provisional voters, and any ballots cast on direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines."  
9 (Exhibit 54, page 15). In the final recommendation to Governor Schwarzenegger: "Summary:  
10 This bill establishes a uniform procedure for elections' officials to conduct the 1% manual tally of  
11 the ballots including (1) the requirement that absentee ballots, provisional ballots, and ballots cast  
12 at satellite locations be included in the tally of ballots..." (Exhibit 54, page 37.)



13       Precedent furthers the support for this conclusion. "Section 15360 appears on its face to be  
14 concerned solely with assuring the accuracy of the vote, not with limiting unnecessary vote  
15 tallying. Indeed, the explicit intent of section 15360, as expressed in a companion statute, is "to  
16 verify the accuracy of the automated count." *County of San Diego v. Bowen* 166 Cal. App. 4th  
17 501, 511-12 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)."

18       In their trial brief (ROA # 93), Defendants assert, at pages 15 - 17:

19       When conducting the random sample selected for the manual tally by the Registrar  
20 includes all ballots included in the semifinal official canvass the day after the election, including  
21 VBM ballots. The County does not include VBM ballots that have yet to be processed and added  
22 into the official canvass results. Similarly, the Registrar does not include any provisional ballots in  
23 the manual tally. The practice followed by the Registrar is consistent with the intent and purpose  
24 of the manual tally and satisfies the requirements of Section 15360.

25       **A. Section 15360 does not Require Provisional Ballots to be Included in the Manual**  
26 **Tally**

27       The Registrar does not include provisional ballots in the manual tally. This practice is  
28 consistent with the practices of other counties and the opinion of the Secretary of State. It is also





1 consistent with the original intent of the Legislature in conducting the 1% manual tally and does  
2 not run afoul of the requirements of Section 15360.

3 As detailed above, prior to 2006, Section 15360 did not expressly require VBM or  
4 provisional ballots to be included in the manual tally. In 2006, the Legislature enacted AB 2769  
5 (Stats. 2006, c. 893, § 1) and AB 2769 (Stats. 2006, ch. 894) amending Section 15360 to read, in  
6 relevant part as follows: "... the official conducting the election shall conduct a public manual  
7 tally of the ballots tabulated by those devices, including absent voters' ballots, cast in 1 percent of  
8 the precincts ...."

9 When introduced, SB 1235 proposed that Section 15360 be amended to also include  
10 "provisional ballots, and ballots cast at satellite locations, cast in 1 percent of the precincts" But,  
11 the reference to "provisional ballots, and ballots cast at satellite locations" was deleted before the  
12 second reading of the bill in committee. Similarly, AB 2769 when introduced also proposed to  
13 include VBM and provisional ballots in the manual tally, but also like SB 1235, once amended all  
14 references to provisional ballots were deleted. "When the Legislature chooses to omit a provision  
15 from the final version of a statute which was included in an earlier version, this is strong evidence  
16 that the act as adopted should not be construed to incorporate the original provision.' [citation]"  
17 *UFCW & Employers Benefit Trust v. Sutter Health* 241 Cal. App. 4th 909, 927 (2015), citing  
18 *People v. Delgado* 214 Cal. App. 4th 914, 918 (2013). As such, it is clear that the Legislature  
19 considered but rejected the idea that provisional ballots were to be included in the manual tally.

20 **B. The Registrar Properly Includes Vote by Mail Ballots in the 1 Percent Manual**  
21 **Tally**

22 VBM ballots are received at different times by different means of delivery. The VBM  
23 ballots associated with a particular precinct are by the very nature of the process sprinkled  
24 throughout all of the VBM ballots included in the semifinal official canvass. Prior to 2012, after  
25 the precincts to be included in the manual tally were selected, elections officials were required to  
26 locate the VBM ballots associated with the randomly selected precincts and integrate those ballots  
27 into the ballots cast at the precincts. This process had to be initiated within several days of the  
28 election in order to complete the manual tally "during the official canvass" and of course could not



1 include VBM ballots that have not yet been processed and counted.



2 In 2011, in an effort to streamline the process and reduce the costs of completing the  
3 manual tally, the Legislature enacted AB 985 amending Section 15360. As amended by AB 985,  
4 Section 15360 election officials now have an option for conducting the manual tally. Election  
5 officials can now conduct the manual tally by precinct as provided under 15360(a)(1) or,  
6 alternatively may conduct a two part manual tally that allows elections officials to manually tally  
7 randomly selected batches of VBM ballots, thereby avoiding the cost and time of having to  
8 integrate the VBM ballots into the randomly selected precincts (see § 15360(a)(2)).

9 The intended purpose of AB 985 was to streamline the process and make it easier, more  
10 efficient and less costly to conduct the manual tally. If the court now interprets AB 985 to require  
11 the Registrar to include all VBM in the manual tally, that interpretation would make the process  
12 more difficult, less efficient and more costly, all of which are contrary to the stated purpose of the  
13 amendment.

14 Both before and after the enactment of AB 985, the Registrar has only included VBM  
15 ballots included in the semifinal official canvass in the manual tally. This practice is consistent  
16 with the intent and purpose of the statute as amended and is also consistent with the practices of  
17 other counties. The practice also reflects the practical necessity of having to complete the official  
18 canvass of the election and certify the results within the statutorily mandated period after the  
19 election.

20 Another reason for not waiting to conduct the manual tally until all of the VBM ballots are  
21 included in the official canvass is that if the Registrar waited and then determined that the vote  
22 tabulating devices were not recording the votes accurately, there would be no time left to correct  
23 the error and rerun all of the ballots previously included in the official canvass. It is in the public's  
24 interest and it is a prudent business practice to begin and complete the manual tally as soon as  
25 possible. Waiting until all of the VBM ballots have been processed and included in the official  
26 canvass would inarguably substantially delay that process."

27 In resolving the controversy over the scope of the "1 percent manual tally" in Section  
28 15360, the Court accepts the issues the parties do not dispute: 1. Elections Code Sections 336.5



1 and 15360 are the operative provisions of the Elections Code that define and govern the one  
2 percent manual tally (to wit, “**One percent manual tally**” is the public process of manually  
3 tallying votes in 1 percent of the precincts, selected at random by the elections official, and in one  
4 precinct for each race not included in the randomly selected precincts.”); 2. Provisional voters are  
5 defined in Election Code Section 14310 – 14313 (to wit, “... a voter claiming to be properly  
6 registered, but whose qualification or entitlement to vote cannot be immediately established upon  
7 examination of the index of registration for the precinct or upon examination of the records on file  
8 with the county elections official, shall be entitled to vote a **provisional ballot ...**”); 3. Vote-by-  
9 mail voters are defined in Election Code Section 300 (to wit, “**Vote by mail voter**” means any  
10 voter casting a ballot in any way other than at the polling place.”); 4. The one percent manual tally  
11 must be conducted and completed during the official canvass; 5. The purpose of the manual tally is  
12 to verify the accuracy of the automated count. (emphasis added by the Court)



13       The Court is disinclined to read any more into the term “1% manual tally” than is necessary  
14 to reasonably construe or interpret its scope.

15       Though the subject of much discussion throughout its history (see, for example,  
16 Defendants’ trial brief, pages 2 – 4), the legislature chose not to include “provisional ballots” in  
17 Section 15360. There appears to be good reason to conclude that this omission was not  
18 inadvertent.

19       As Defendants argue, at pages 8 – 9 of their trial brief:

20       “Voters may be required to vote provisionally on the day of the election for a number of  
21 reasons. One reason that a voter may be asked to vote provisionally is because the voter is  
22 registered as a VBM voter and has been issued a mail ballot, but wants to vote at the poll. The  
23 purpose of having a voter registered as a VBM voter vote provisionally is to provide a safeguard  
24 against the possibility that the VBM voter has already returned his or her VBM ballot and had his  
25 or her VBM ballot counted. In the June Presidential Primary more than one-half of the 75,386  
26 voters who voted provisionally were VBM voters who appeared at the polls on election-day but  
27 who could not surrender their VBM ballot. And, in fact, during the canvass, the Registrar  
28 determined that 521 voters voted both their VBM ballot and a provisional ballot.







1 Another reason for requiring a voter to vote provisionally is because the voter does not  
2 appear on the roster of voters at the precinct where they appear to vote. For example, if a non-  
3 VBM voter is registered to vote in a precinct in Poway but the voter appears at a poll in Chula  
4 Vista, that voter would be given a provisional envelope in which the voter would place his voted  
5 ballot, which is then returned to the Registrar's office unopened for final determination. After  
6 voting, the voter is instructed to complete all of the information required on the outside of the  
7 provisional ballot envelope, including, among other things, the voter's current residence address.  
8 The voter is also required to sign and seal the envelope, and return the envelope to the poll worker  
9 for deposit into the ballot box. In the June Presidential Primary more than 12,000 voters appeared  
10 at a poll other than where they were registered and voted provisionally.

11 Another reason for requiring a voter to vote provisionally is unique to "semi-open primary"  
12 elections like the June Presidential Primary. The Republican, Green, and Peace and Freedom party  
13 primaries were "closed elections" meaning that only voters registered with one of those particular  
14 parties were allowed to vote for that party's presidential candidates. In contrast, the Democratic,  
15 American Independent, and Libertarian party primaries were "open primaries" meaning that voters  
16 who had registered "No Party Preference" ("NPP") were allowed to vote for any one of those  
17 parties' presidential candidates. In no instance could a voter registered with a particular party vote  
18 for the presidential candidates of another political party. These rules are established by the parties,  
19 not the State and not by local election officials."

20 Vu's trial testimony – which the Court perceived to be credible – is consistent with  
21 Defendants' trial brief explanation of the circumstances under which provisional ballots are cast.  
22 The Court finds the initial explanation (a provisional voter may be a voter who is "registered as a  
23 VBM voter and has been issued a mail ballot, but wants to vote at the poll") to be significant. The  
24 Court infers from this explanation that provisional ballots may be nothing more than duplicate  
25 ballots of VBM ballots cast by the same voters. Indeed, according to Defendants "In the June  
26 Presidential Primary, more than one-half of the 75,386 voters who voted provisionally were VBM  
27 voters who appeared at the polls on election-day but who could not surrender their VBM ballot.  
28 And, in fact, during the canvass, the Registrar determined that 521 voters voted both their VBM





1 ballot and a provisional ballot.” If the Court were to accept Plaintiffs’ argument that Section  
2 15360’s 1% manual tally audit procedure includes “all ballots cast” including provisional ballots  
3 (Plaintiffs’ trial brief at pages 4 – 7), Plaintiffs are, in effect, advocating that Defendants assume  
4 the risk of including **more than 100% of the ballots cast** in the 1% manual tally. Not only does  
5 this interpretation strike the Court as unreasonable but it has the inevitable consequences of adding  
6 burden to the County’s ROV, whose resources are already stretched far too thin.

7       Accordingly, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s interpretation that the 1% manual tally include  
8 provisional ballots.

9       On the other hand, Plaintiffs’ interpretation that all VBM ballots should be included in the  
10 1% manual tally strikes the Court as more reasonable than Defendants’ rejection of the need to do  
11 so. First, Section 15360 specifically dictates that the 1% manual tally include VBM ballots.  
12 Second, the statute’s legislative history supports the inclusion of VBM ballots. Third, the  
13 inclusion of all VBM ballots strikes the Court as more conducive to a “**uniform procedure** for  
14 elections’ officials to conduct the 1% manual tally of the ballots” (Plaintiffs’ trial brief, at pages 5  
15 – 6) and toward accomplishing the goal of verifying “the accuracy of the automated count.” Based  
16 on the trial evidence, the ROVs appear to include as many, or as few, VBM ballots as have been  
17 received and processed in the 1% manual tally. For example, according to Rodewald, San Luis  
18 Obispo does not include VBM ballots not counted as of the election day in the 1% manual tally;  
19 according to Logan, L.A. only includes VBM ballots which were both received and counted as of  
20 the election day in the 1% manual tally; according to LaVine, Sacramento strives to include as  
21 many VBM ballots as possible into the 1% manual tally; according to Vu, San Diego does not  
22 include VBM ballots not processed by election night in the 1% manual tally. The disparity of the  
23 ROVs practices throughout the State strikes the Court as more a reflection upon the limited  
24 resources within which the ROVs are expected to discharge their statutory duties than compliance  
25 with a reasonable interpretation of Section 15360. The Secretary of State’s contrary opinion (Exh.  
26 “107”) is rejected.

27       Accordingly, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s interpretation that the 1% manual tally include  
28 all VBM ballots. In doing so, the Court emphasizes that its intention is not to call into question the





1 credibility of the ROVs who testified at trial. It's apparent that the ROVs are experienced, skillful,  
2 and devoted public servants who are tasked with the challenge of overseeing an extraordinarily  
3 complex voting system.


4  
5 **Plaintiffs' SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION for MANDAMUS - CCP 1085**

6  
7 A writ of mandate compelling the County Registrar of Voters Office to comply with the  
8 California Elections Code is a proper remedy. The Court will issue a writ of mandate "to any  
9 inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law  
10 specifically enjoins, ... or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or  
11 office to which the party is entitled, and from which the party is unlawfully precluded by such  
12 inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person." Code Civ. Proc. 1085(a). "Mandamus is the  
13 correct remedy for compelling an officer to conduct an election according to law.... It is also an  
14 appropriate vehicle for challenging the constitutionality of statutes and official acts." *Hoffman v.*  
15 *State Bar of California* (2003) 113 Cal. App. 4th 630, 639 (internal citations omitted).

16 In *People v. Karriker* (2007) 149 Cal. App. 4th 763, 774, the Court stated:

17  
18 ... Mandamus will lie, however, "to compel a public official to  
19 perform an official act required by law." (*Ibid.*) "Code of Civil  
20 Procedure section 1085, providing for writs of mandate, permits  
21 challenges to ministerial acts by local officials. To obtain such a  
22 writ, the petitioner must show (1) a clear, present, ministerial duty on  
23 the part of the respondent and (2) a correlative clear, present, and  
24 beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance of that duty.  
25 [Citations.] A ministerial duty is an act that a public officer is  
26 obligated to perform in a prescribed manner required by law when a  
27 given state of facts exists. [Citations.]

28 The Court finds that Defendants are "obligated" to include all VBM ballots in the 1%  
manual tally, in performance of the requirements imposed on elections officials by Elections Code  
Sections 336.5 and 15360. To this extent, the Court grants the relief sought by Plaintiffs to require  
Defendants to "to fully comply with the breadth of California Elections Code Section 15360."  
SAC, page 12.



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**Conclusion**

The Court:


1. Finds in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants MICHAEL VU and COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO on Plaintiffs' claim that Section 15360 requires the Registrar of Voters to include all VBM ballots in the random selection process for purposes of completing the 1 percent manual tally;

2. Finds in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs on Plaintiffs' claim that Section 15360 requires the Registrar of Voters to include provisional ballots in the random selection process for purposes of completing the 1 percent manual tally; and

3. Finds in favor Defendant HELEN ROBBINS-MEYER and against Plaintiffs on all causes of action raised by Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 12-19-16

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
JOEL R. WOHLFEIL  
Judge of the Superior Court